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“Savages” in the Service of Empire: Native
American Soldiers in Gorham’s Rangers,
1744–1762
brian d. carroll
GORHAM’S RANGERS, formed in 1744 as an auxiliaryunit of the Massachusetts provincial army, was an am-
phibious strike force that patrolled the coasts, inlets, bays, and
rivers of the Canadian Maritimes in modified whaleboats.1 Ini-
tially manned by Native Americans from southeastern Mas-
sachusetts and commanded by British colonial officers, by its
final deployments in the early 1760s, Gorham’s Rangers had
become a unit of mostly Anglo-Americans and recent Scots
and Irish immigrants who, nonetheless, continued to employ
the tactics the unit’s original Indian members had pioneered.
For Indian members of the company the cost had been dear;
combat fatalities, disease, debilitating wounds and injuries, and
years of brutal captivity in French or Indian communities in
Canada were common fates.
Robert Rogers is widely credited with instituting the Amer-
ican ranger tradition and, thus, with establishing, during the
French and Indian War (1754–63), a uniquely American style
of warfare based in Indian strategies. Dating that innovation to
I express my sincerest gratitude to Wayne E. Lee, Geoffrey Plank, and Andrew
Pierce for sharing citations, sources, or copies of unpublished work. Also many thanks
to Marna Carroll, Harald E. L. Prins, Wayne E. Lee, Daniel R. Mandell, Erik See-
man, William P. Tatum III, Jean-François Lozier, and Daniel Herman, all of whom
commented on drafts or were willing to discuss aspects of the article with me.
1Earlier units commanded by Benjamin Church had done likewise in Maine in the
1690s and early 1700s. See my “From Warrior to Soldier: New England Indians in
the Colonial Military, 1676–1763” (Ph.D diss., University of Connecticut, 2009), pp.
157–93.
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an earlier period, some scholars assert that Rogers was merely
heir apparent to men such as Benjamin Church, who secured an
English victory during King Philip’s War (1675–76) by im-
plementing Indian martial practices. Still others argue that
the American way of war emerged from a grand, post-
contact dialogical process that significantly altered military
methods among Native Americans and Anglo-Americans alike.2
Gorham’s Rangers, arguably the true descendants of Church’s
early companies as well as the immediate antecedents to and
model for Rogers’s Rangers, offers an opportunity to assess
these reigning assumptions and to examine the evolution of
American warfare at the edges of empire.
Church and Rogers are well known largely because each
published a detailed (and self-serving) memoir chronicling his
accomplishments;3 John Gorham III (1709–51) and his younger
2Wayne Lee reviews the literature in “Early American Ways of War: A New Re-
connaissance, 1600–1815,” Historical Journal 44 (2001): 269–89, and in “Mind and
Matter—Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the
Field,” Journal of American History 93 (2007): 1116–42. John Grenier’s assessment
of the literature is much the same in The First Way of War: American War Making
on the Frontier, 1607–1814 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 6–10.
Russell Weigley, in his The American Way of War: A History of United States Mil-
itary Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), argues for
a uniquely American way of war characterized not by “irregular” or “regular” tactics
but by wars of attrition or wars of annihilation. Armstrong Starkey, who posits in his
European and Native American Warfare (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1998)
that Europeans were never terribly successful at adopting Native American frontier
warfare (guerilla tactics) until 1814, essentially agrees with Guy Chet, who claims, in
his Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the
Colonial Northeast (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), that European
linear tactics remained dominant throughout the colonial period. Refuting Starkey and
Chet, Grenier insists that the early American way of war was characterized by intense
intercultural violence, irregular frontier warfare, and campaigns of total war that were
aimed at killing noncombatants and destroying Indian villages and resources. In “Mind
and Matter,” Lee concurs: “Norms of warfare against Indians included scalping, village
destruction, food destruction, indiscriminate killing of women and children (or even al-
lied Indians), enslavement, and very likely rape” (“Mind and Matter,” p. 1128); Adam J.
Hirsch, in “The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England,”
Journal of American History 74 (1988): 1187–212, and Patrick M. Malone, in The
Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians (New
York: Madison Books, 1991), pioneered the “collision of military cultures” thesis, which
maintains that Europeans and Native Americans adjusted to intercultural violence and
adopted total war practices.
3Church’s memoir was compiled toward the end of his life with the assistance of
his son. Thomas Church, Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip’s War . . . Also
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brother Joseph (1724–90) left no such record. Still, as will
be explored and analyzed below, widely scattered documents
relating to the activities of Gorham’s Rangers in the north-
eastern borderlands and to the company’s origins, organiza-
tion, and composition amply demonstrate the critical role the
unit’s Native American soldiers played in forging the “irregu-
lar” or guerilla tactics most often attributed to Church and to
Rogers.4
“Indians and Other Men Fit for Ranging”
As early as King Philip’s War, the colonies of Connecticut and
Massachusetts began incorporating settlement or reservation
Indians, in this case Mohegan and Pequot tribal units, into their
armed forces while also forming special companies of Nipmuc
and Wampanoag warriors led by English commanders. Over
the next sixty-five years, as the colonies expanded this practice,
Native Americans assumed an increasingly important role in
New England’s military endeavors. Why Indian warriors would
have chosen to fight for their conquerors and oppressors is a
complex phenomenon that speaks to the conditions they faced
in the aftermath of King Philip’s demise.
English victory in that conflict radically affected the lives
of all Native Americans in southern New England. First, they
lost their political independence; then, as colonial settlements
encroached on their lands, they suffered a shrinking resource
base and ecological change. In time, they were relegated to
dozens of small reservations peppered throughout the region,
or they eked out a living in enclaves on the margins of colonial
of Expeditions More lately made Against the Common Enemy, and Indian Rebels, in
the Eastern Parts of New England . . . (Boston: Benjamin Green, 1716); Journals of
Major Robert Rogers: Containing An Account of several Excursions he made under the
Generals who commanded upon the Continent of North America . . . (London, 1765).
4Papers relating to Gorham’s company are in Quebec, Ottawa, and Halifax in
Canada and Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, and California in the
United States. The best history of Gorham’s Rangers to date is in John Grenier’s
The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710–1760 (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2008), the strength of which lies in Grenier’s detailed chronicling of
the company’s operational history. Grenier also briefly examined Gorham’s Rangers in
The First Way of War, pp. 68–69.
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towns. Many converted to Christianity, began speaking English,
and outwardly adopted aspects of European culture.5 As their
appetite for the consumer goods of the transatlantic market
economy increased, so did the Indians’ indebtedness, which
the colonists’ predatory lending practices rendered chronic and
persistent. To survive, Native men took jobs as common la-
borers and mariners, particularly as whalers. During the early
eighteenth century, some were forced to indenture themselves
to whites for terms ranging from a few months to as long as
ten years, while women seeking to settle their debts indentured
themselves, and sometimes their children, as servants in En-
glish households. Other Native women worked plots of land,
dispensed herbal remedies, or produced handicrafts. Despite
such attempts, settlement Indians became increasingly impov-
erished. For at least part of the year, some tribes and bands
were dependent on the supplies provincial overseers or mis-
sionary aid societies distributed to them.6
Indian men, who faced discrimination, mounting debts, and
grinding poverty, thus found it difficult to resist provincial re-
cruiters’ enticements, from cash signing bonuses to promises of
5The study of the cultural effects of colonialism on Native Americans in southern
New England is extensive. Although by no means an exhaustive list, important recent
works include Daniel R. Mandell, Behind the Frontier: Indians in Eighteenth-Century
Eastern Massachusetts (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), and Tribe, Race,
History: Native Americans in Southern New England, 1780–1880 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2008); Jean M. O’Brien, Dispossession by Degrees: Indian
Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650–1790 (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1997); David J. Silverman, Faith and Boundaries: Colonists, Christianity,
and Community among the Wampanoag Indians of Martha’s Vineyard, 1600–1871
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Amy E. Den Ouden, Beyond Conquest:
Native Peoples and the Struggle for History in New England (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2005); Jenny Hale Pulsipher, “Subjects unto the Same King”: Indians,
English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); and R. Todd Romero, Making War and Minting
Christians: Masculinity, Religion, and Colonialism in Early New England (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 2011).
6See various overseers accounts for Mashpee (1749–51; 1758–61) and Punkapoag
(1745–47), Massachusetts Archives Collection, Massachusetts State Archives, Boston,
vols. 32:129; 33:179–84; 31:554a–56a. See also Silverman, Faith and Boundaries,
pp. 188–99, 214–15, and Kevin McBride, “Transformation by Degree: Eighteenth-
Century Native American Land Use,” in Eighteenth-Century Native Communities in
Southern New England in the Colonial Context, ed. Jack Campisi (Mashantucket,
Conn.: Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center, 2005), pp. 35–56.
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scalp bounties.7 To encourage enlistment, provincial agents
treated entire Indian communities to gifts of food, alcohol, and
trade goods. Moreover, at a time when Protestant missionaries
and colony officials sought to circumscribe the activities of Na-
tive American men and convert them into sedentary Christian
farmers, the military offered a compelling alternative, one that
honored older warrior traditions (bravery, ferocity in battle, and
hunting skills) and held the promise of prestige similar to that
conferred by Indian war parties.8 While the English saw mili-
tary service as a means of channeling Indian aggression toward
provincial and imperial ends, Native American leaders hoped
that their men’s contributions might carry weight in land and le-
gal disputes and ultimately secure greater recognition of tribal
sovereignty. Family and band loyalties also had an influence, for
many indigenous enlistees came from interrelated communities
and regularly enrolled with and served alongside kin.
New Englanders thought Indian populations living in their
midst culturally inferior, but, like select other conquered
peoples in the expanding British Empire, Native American
soldiers serving in the provincial forces during King William’s
War (1689–97), Queen Anne’s War (1703–13), and Governor
Dummer’s War (1722–26) were viewed as possessing a special
aptitude for warfare, especially within a forest setting, and
as absolutely vital to combating enemy Indians, who were
skilled at resisting traditional English military maneuvers.
Usually comprising between 15 and 20 percent of early New
England military expeditions, Indian soldiers often served in
autonomous, all-Indian companies commanded by English,
and sometimes Native, officers.9
7Per statute, all indentured soldiers could keep enlistment bonuses, money earned
from scalp bounties, as well as any plunder taken while on campaign. The Acts and
Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of Massachusetts Bay . . . , vol. 13:
1741–1747 (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1905), p. 629.
8See Romero, Making War and Minting Christians, pp. 138–40.
9Cynthia Enloe, in her Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1982), uses the term “ethnic soldiers” to describe certain
minority groups within a multi-ethnic state deemed trustworthy by ruling elites and
well suited to military service. Wayne E. Lee, in his “Subjects, Clients, Allies or Mer-
cenaries? The British Use of Irish and Indian Military Power, 1500–1815,” in Britain’s
Oceanic Empire: British Expansion in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550–
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Indians’ role in the provincial army changed dramatically
during King George’s War (1744–48) and the French and In-
dian War. Due to Native population decline, greater imperial
involvement, and the larger scale of the conflicts, Indians were
less apt to serve in all-Indian units and instead were integrated
into predominantly white companies. Only a handful advanced
beyond the rank of corporal. Still, the demands of imperial
warfare in the Northeast produced new opportunities for New
England’s Indian men, including positions in Gorham’s ranger
corps.10
The Gorham family was active in colonial New England’s
military affairs. John and Joseph’s great-grandfather, John
Gorham I, had been a commander for Plymouth Colony during
King Philip’s War. Their grandfather, John Gorham II, led
English and Wampanoag troops during King William’s War;
he commanded first a company and then, later, a battalion,
and he was Benjamin Church’s second-in-command during
campaigns against the Abenaki. John and Joseph’s father,
Shubael Gorham, was a veteran provincial officer of Queen
Anne’s War. Numerous uncles and cousins served as officers
throughout the colonial era, some recruiting and commanding
Indian soldiers. With the exception of the Churches, no other
family was more responsible for the development of New
England’s Native American soldiery and the American ranger
tradition than were the Gorhams and their kin.11
1850, ed. H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), pp. 179–217, sees a “martial race” as a particular group re-
cruited for their expertise in a style of warfare, especially one suited to local conditions
but integrated into the same organizational and technological structure as the rest of
an army. See also Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculin-
ity in British Imperial Culture, 1857–1914 (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University
Press, 2004); Tom Holm, “The militarization of Native America: Historical process and
cultural perception,” Social Science Journal 34 (1997): 461–74; Harald E. L. Prins, The
Mi’kmaq: Resistance, Accommodation, and Cultural Survival (New York: Wadsworth,
1996), pp. 85–87, 133–57.
10Other all-Indian units included three Native American companies in Roger’s
Rangers—two companies of Stockbridge Mohicans and one of Mohegans from Con-
necticut. See John R. Cuneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1959), pp. 42, 82, 94–96, 127.
11Mass. Archives, 71:325, 381. Related family members included cousins Richard,
Silvanus, William, and Melatiah Bourne.
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As they attempted to subdue Acadians and Mi’kmaq Indians
who challenged English sovereignty in Nova Scotia (previously
Acadia) during the 1740s, the British relied heavily on New
England’s Native American soldiers.12 Early in June 1744, Paul
Mascerene, the governor and garrison commander at Annapolis
Royal (formerly Port Royal), wrote to Massachusetts Governor
William Shirley to ask for reinforcements for his besieged gar-
rison, which was barricaded within Fort Anne. Mascerene re-
quested “20 or 30 bold and warlike Indians” who could “awe the
Indians of this peninsula[,] who believe all the Indians [who]
come from New England are Mohawks[,] of whom they stand
in great fear.” The Massachusetts legislature approved funding
for the relief force, and in July, Shirley wrote to the Lords of
Trade in England outlining his plan:
I depend upon sending to Annapolis in a few days Seventy more
Soldiers raised here, which will consist chiefly of pick’d Indians and
other men fit for ranging the woods under a very expert Officer for
that Service, who has undertaken (and upon a probable scheme as it
appears to me) to destroy and drive off all the Indians.
His man for the job was John Gorham, whose family had exten-
sive business and maritime connections as well as political and
social clout. Undoubtedly lured by a lucrative bounty, almost
all of the rangers who enlisted lived near Gorham’s hometown
of Yarmouth, on Cape Cod.13
12Nova Scotia became part of the British Empire in 1713, but the area was far
from pacified in the 1740s. Acadia, present-day Nova Scotia and parts of present-day
New Brunswick, was ill defined, and its borders were in contention. See Geoffrey
Plank, An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign against the Peoples of Acadia
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), pp. 40–41, 70–72, 76, and John
Mack Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of the
French Acadians from Their American Homeland (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005),
pp. 136–45.
13Paul Mascerene to William Shirley, 9 June 1744, quoted in George A. Rawlyk,
Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts: A Study in Massachusetts–Nova Scotia Relations, 1630–
1784 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973), pp. 140, 269; William Shirley,
Memoirs of the Principal Transactions of the Last War between the English and French
in North-America—From the commencement of it in 1744, to the conclusion of the
treaty at Aix la Chapelle . . . (Boston, 1758), pp. 26, 28–29. New England Indians
being confused with “Mohawks” probably stems from both New England Algonquians
and Iroquois warriors, both in the service of the British, being stationed at Annapolis
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As is evident from muster rolls and other descriptions, leader-
ship positions—including three officers, four noncommissioned
officers, a company clerk, and, unique to the unit, several
“boatmasters,” who were responsible for the upkeep of the
company’s six or seven large whaleboats—were monopolized
by Anglo-Americans, some of whom were Gorham’s relatives.
But the sixty remaining men, who made up the rank and file,
were Native Americans. The vast majority, about fifty-five, were
Nauset and Wampanoag Indians from Cape Cod (Barnstable
County). The indigenous population of the area being in seri-
ous decline at the time, marshaling the company significantly
strained the manpower resources of the area’s Indian commu-
nities (see fig. 1).14
Gorham also recruited a handful of Pigwacket warriors. This
tribe’s traditional lands lay more than a hundred miles north
of Cape Cod, along the upper Saco River in southwestern
Maine and extending into the uplands of central New Hamp-
shire. As members of the Wabanaki confederacy, an alliance
of various Abenaki tribal communities in northeastern New
England as well as Maliseet, Passamaquaddy, and Mi’kmaq
groups, the Pigwacket were traditionally aligned with the
Royal in 1710–11. See Geoffrey Plank, “Deploying Tribes and Clans: Mohawks in Nova
Scotia and Scottish Highlanders in Georgia,” in Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural
Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World, ed. Wayne
E. Lee (New York: New York University Press, 2011), pp. 221–49. For members of
Gorham’s well-connected family holding positions as magistrates, missionaries, and
reservation overseers, see Frederick Freeman, The History of Cape Cod: The Annals
of Barnstable County and of Its Several Towns, 2 vols. (Boston, 1860, 1862), 1:378,
730–38; 2:203, 445; and The Massachusetts Civil List for the Colonial and Provincial
Period, 1630–1774, ed. William H. Whitemore (Albany, N.Y.: J. Munsell, 1870), pp.
54–61, 72–76, 104–6, 113, 127, 141–46.
14The size of the unit has often been underestimated because the earliest muster
roll lists just forty-one men (and only twenty-two Native Americans). But this roll in
fact records a much depleted unit at the end of its first three-year deployment in
1746, not a full company at its beginning. The company initially contained seventy
men, almost twice the number cited by John Grenier in The First Way of War, pp.
68–69, who also claimed that white frontiersmen were Gorham and Shirley’s preferred
enlistees. See undated (ca. 1746) muster roll, John Gorham Papers, Clements Library,
Ann Arbor, Mich.; Joseph Gorham, “Return of Troops, Rangers from Nova Scotia,”
23 February 1748, Gilder Lehrman Collection, Gilder Lehrman Institute for Ameri-
can History, New York; “Names officers & men on Comd when took 3 frenchmen,”
1 January 1749[/1750], Gorham Papers (this appears to be a partial muster roll). For
Indian population estimates of Barnstable County, see note 59.
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Fig. 1.—Cape Cod Indian enclaves (Barnstable County), circa 1750, the primary area
of recruitment for Gorham’s Rangers. Map prepared by author.
French and therefore enemies of the British. Thus, during
periods of conflict, their close proximity to English settlements
often forced them to flee for safety to the Saint Francis Jesuit
mission at Odanak, near Quebec. In 1744, however, with King
George’s War looming, one small band instead placed itself un-
der the protection of Massachusetts. Six of the men from this
group agreed to serve in the provincial army and were assigned
to Gorham’s Rangers. As Benjamin Church had once done
for bands of Wampanoag during King Philip’s War, Gorham
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helped relocate and assist the Pigwacket families during
wartime.15
More than skill, patronage was key to Gorham’s securing his
commission. His father and another relative, Silvanus Bourne,
were legislators who held seats on the Governor’s Council. In
exchange for their support, Shirley rewarded members of the
interrelated families with government posts and military com-
missions. Despite his impressive political connections and his
family’s military background, Gorham was not, like other ranger
commanders (specifically Rogers), a frontiersman; nor was he
a hunter nor a veteran of earlier borderland wars. Apparently
he was not taught the arts of war beyond the basics every colo-
nial Englishman learned at the local militia muster—typically a
rather amateurish event. Too young to have served on any prior
military campaigns, Gorham was only thirteen at the outbreak
of New England’s last frontier conflict, Governor Dummer’s
War. Following this short regional war against the Wabanaki
Confederacy, colonial New England enjoyed one of its longest
periods of uninterrupted peace.
Gorham’s first calling was the sea. He grew up in a mer-
cantile family far from the frontier, in Barnstable, one of the
oldest towns on Cape Cod, established by the Pilgrims of Ply-
mouth Colony in the mid-1630s. From a young age, he trained
in the early whaling industry, then the most lucrative business
on the Cape. According to one eyewitness, he was a “dex-
trous” harpooneer, and over time he became a skilled whaler,
mariner, and merchant. He lived most of his adult life in
coastal Yarmouth, adjacent to Barnstable, but did some land
speculating and had investments, including several sawmills, in
the frontier towns of southern Maine. When conflict between
England and France recommenced in 1744, Gorham was
15Petition of John Gorham Esq. to the Governor and General Court of Mas-
sachusetts, Boston, 5 April 1749, Mass. Archives, 73:393–99; Correspondence of
William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America,
1731–1760, vol. 1, ed. Charles Henry Lincoln (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 138.
Various government dispatches deal with the Pigwacket coming into Massachusetts
jurisdiction, including Mass. Archives, 31:494, 495, 501, 502; 32:2, 20–23. This band of
Pigwackets settled for a time in Rochester, Mass. (see Mandell, Beyond the Frontier,
pp. 130, 172).
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thirty-five years old.16 Commanding whaling vessels had pre-
pared him to lead the rangers. It not only familiarized him with
leadership, discipline, and logistics, but, most important, it gave
him practical experience in recruiting and managing Indians.
During the first half of the eighteenth century, indentured
Indian servants comprised the vast majority of whalers in New
England’s shore industry as well the first crewmen on deep-sea
whaling ships departing from area ports. We know from records
of two of the voyages of Gorham’s sloop Neptune that his crews
were primarily Indians from local Native communities—like
nearby Mashpee, where his father and uncle were the provin-
cially appointed overseers. When hunting North Atlantic right
whales, Gorham’s ships resupplied and refitted in Newfound-
land and Nova Scotia, and so he was familiar with the Maritime
Provinces, where his company would later operate.17
The company’s junior officers were just as inexperienced as
Gorham, but there was depth in the ranks. A number of the
enlistees, the vast majority of whom were indentured Indian
whalemen who worked for Gorham’s family and associates,
were also veteran soldiers and experienced rangers who had
fought for the English in previous wars. Joseph Ralph, a village
16Journal of the Honourable House of Representatives, of His Majesty’s Province
of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England . . . (Boston: Printed by Samuel Kneeland,
1740), p. 87; Francis G. Hutchins, Mashpee: The Story of Cape Cod’s Indian Town
(West Franklin, N.H.: Amarta Press, 1979), pp. 72–73, 83; Expeditions of Honour: The
Journal of John Salusbury in Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1749–1753, ed. Ronald Rompkey
(Dover: University of Delaware Press, 1982), pp. 115, 119.
17For Indians and early whaling, see Daniel Vickers, “The First Whalemen of
Nantucket,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser. 40 (1983): 560–83, and “Nantucket
Whalemen in the Deep-Sea Fishery: The Changing Anatomy of an Early American La-
bor Force,” Journal of American History 72 (1985): 277–96; Elizabeth A. Little, “Indian
Contributions to Shore Whaling,” Nantucket Algonquian Studies 8 (1981): 38; Mark
A. Nicholas, “Mashpee Wampanoags of Cape Cod, the Whalefishery, and Seafaring’s
Impact on Community Development,” American Indian Quarterly 26 (2002): 162–95;
Russell Lawrence Basch, “ ‘Colored’ Seamen in the New England Whaling Industry:
An Afro-Indian Consortium,” in Confounding the Color Line: The Indian-Black Expe-
rience in North America, ed. James F. Brooks (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2002); John Braginton-Smith and Duncan Oliver, Cape Cod Shore Whaling: Amer-
ica’s First Whalemen (Yarmouth, Mass.: Historical Society of Old Yarmouth, 2004).
For Gorham’s whaling interests, see “Jno. Gorham’s Memorandum or Dayly Journal,”
1737–38, and John Gorham’s “Wast[e] Book,” 1745, Special Collections [microform],
Sturgis Library, Barnstable, Mass.
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leader among the Nauset, served in a similar all-Indian ranger
company twenty years earlier during Governor Dummer’s War.
Commanded by Captain Richard Bourne (1694–1738), another
of Gorham’s kinsmen, the unit deployed three times to the
Maine frontier in 1724–25. Its mission each time was to sub-
due Indian resistance to British rule, which involved raiding
Abenaki villages and scouting for and skirmishing with small
Native war parties. Older, more experienced in military matters,
and better connected politically than Bourne, Shubael Gorham
helped organize and outfit his relative’s company, supplying it
with much of its equipment and its special whaleboats. John
knew (or would later know) many of these Indians, who went
on to work on the vessels he owned. One, James Queach of
Yarmouth, had also served in Bourne’s company. Renowned
for having killed a Norridgewock sachem in one-on-one com-
bat, he had also scalped four or five Abenaki in a single en-
counter during the war. Another Nauset recruited in 1744 was
Peter Dogamus, also of Yarmouth. Then in his fifties, he was
probably the most experienced warrior on the Cape, having
served in Queen Anne’s War more than thirty years earlier
in an all-Indian company recruited by Benjamin Church and
commanded by Church’s son. As a member of this unit, Doga-
mus took part in the 1710 siege and capture of Port Royal, so
for him the area around Annapolis Royal was familiar territory.
Like Ralph, Queach, and others in the unit, he had also served
in Bourne’s 1724–25 companies. Several of the Pigwacket con-
tingent were also veterans of Governor Dummer’s War, but,
as members of the Wabanaki Confederacy, they had fought
against the English.18
18For muster lists for Richard Bourne’s 1725 companies, see Mass. Archives,
91:139–41, 178–80, 223. Bourne’s unit took a leading role in the August 1724 at-
tack on Norridgewock. See Boston News-Letter, 27 August 1724; American Weekly
Mercury (Philadelphia), 10 September 1724; anon., The Rebel’s Reward: Or, English
Courage Display’d, Being A Full and True Account of the Victory over the Indians at
Norridgewock (Boston, 1725); Grenier, The First Way of War, p. 38; Samuel Penhal-
low, The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians (Boston, 1726),
p. 132. The junior officers included John’s brother Joseph and their cousin William
Bourne (1723–70). Samuel Eliot Morison, “Harvard in the Colonial Wars, 1675–1748,”
Harvard Graduates Magazine 26 (1917–18): 572.
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The Pigwacket members, while few in number, were vital
to the company’s initial success. Serving from its formation
through its first two deployments (until 1750), they “behav’d
with Courage & Faithfulness against our Enemies,” according
to Gorham. Among the Pigwackets was a man the colonists
called “Captain Sam,” probably the leader French sources
referred to as Jérôme Atecouando, son of the sachem Ate-
couando, and later a celebrated orator among the Abenaki
at Odanak. His Christian name, Jérôme, was sometimes ren-
dered by the English on treaties as “Saaram,” which may have
been bastardized to “Sam.” Probably in his mid-forties when re-
cruited to the rangers, he had been an important leader among
his people since 1729, when he first represented the Pigwacket
at treaty signings. According to Gorham, the Pigwackets’ in-
timate knowledge of Mi’kmaq territory caused their foes “no
small uneasiness” during the war. A skilled guide, scout, trans-
lator, and negotiator, Captain Sam was recognized in several
sources as Gorham’s most trusted Indian soldier, which sug-
gests that he was an unofficial officer, perhaps adjutant.19
“Their Skulking Way of Fighting”
Called up to “awe the local Indians,” awe they did. Once on
the frontier, Gorham’s Rangers had a dramatic impact. “These
19Petition of John Gorham; Captain Sam, or Captain Samuel, was probably the
Pigwacket/Arresaguntacook/St. Francis sachem identified in French and English
records alternately as “Saaroom,” “Salom,” or “Jerome” (at treaty of 1727). His full
name is most likely Jérôme Atecouando (rendered in colonial records variously as
Atecuando, Atièouando, and Adeawando). His father, the sachem Atecouando of Pig-
wacket, signed the treaty of Portsmouth in 1713 (a “Capt. Sam” of Kennebec also
signed). His brother was most likely a man the English called Sussup (sometimes
spelled Sozap or Suzack), known to the French as Joseph Atecouando. According
to Gordon Day’s translation, Atecouando means “deer spirit-power” or possibly “dog
spirit-power.” Jerome’s child might have been the renowned Molly Ockett, a famous
doctor and herbalist who later married a Sussup—possibly a cousin. See Gordon M.
Day, The Identity of the St. Francis Indians (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada,
1981), pp. 3, 32–38, 41–42, 67–68; Boston News-Letter, 4 October 1744; Boston Post
Boy, 11 November 1744; New York Weekly Journal, 26 December 1748; Documentary
History of the State of Maine, ed. James P. Baxter, vol. 11 (“Baxter Manuscripts”), Col-
lections of the Maine Historical Society, 2nd ser. (1908), pp. 60, 71–74; Bunny McBride
and Harald E. L. Prins, “Walking the Medicine Line: Molly Ockett, a Pigwacket,” in
Northeastern Indian Lives, 1632–1816, ed. Robert S. Grumet (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1996), pp. 325–29.
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Indians, under the management of officers who understood
the proper use of them, and to whose orders they were per-
fectly obedient,” Shirley recalled, liberated Annapolis Royal.
They scouted and patrolled forested areas for which “Regular
Troops are by no means fit.” Mascerene, too, noted that the
rangers were adept at countering the forest warfare tactics of
the Mi’kmaq, even as he tried to rescue English troops from a
humiliating comparison with the provincial auxiliaries. Writing
to the Lords of Trade in England, he reported that
the preservation of this place is owing to the reinforcement we have
received from the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, and how nec-
essary it is to set Indians against Indians; for tho’ our men outdo them
in bravery yet being unacquainted with their skulking way of fighting
and scorning to fight undercover, expose themselves too much to the
enemy’s shot.
Gorham’s strategy to subdue local resistance included sub-
terfuge, “skulking,” surprise attacks, and terror against en-
emy noncombatants, including taking captives (some used as
hostages, some killed, and a few sold for servants in New En-
gland), and killing and scalping Mi’kmaq women and children.20
According to a newspaper account, “the Garrison soldiers
[were] entirely unacquainted with the manner of hunting and
pursuing [Indians] in the Woods, and Bush fighting in skulking
parties.” And so Gorham’s Rangers taught them their ways. In
December 1746 and January 1747, records show that they also
trained a battalion of Massachusetts provincial troops stationed
at a garrison at Grand Pré, in northwestern Nova Scotia, in the
basics of guerilla warfare (see fig. 2). Their brand of warfare
was not uniquely Native American but represented more than
a century of military innovation targeted toward and evolv-
ing out of the exigencies of the frontier. In the seventeenth
century the region’s Native Americans adopted firearms and
20Shirley, Memoirs of the Principal Transactions, pp. 28–29; Shirley to the Duke of
Newcastle, 27 February 1746, in Documentary History of the State of Maine, 11:314–
15; Paul Mascarene to the Lords of Trade, 25 September 1744, in Selections from
the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia, ed. Thomas B. Atkins (Halifax,
1869), pp. 133–34; Grenier, First Way of War, pp. 72, 80, 85, and The Far Reaches of
Empire, p. 153.
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steel-edged weapons which, along with other factors, fueled
competition among tribes and changed how wars were waged.
The fathers and grandfathers of some of Gorham’s Indian
rangers had served with Benjamin Church and John Gorham II
in King Philip’s and King William’s Wars. Many of the
Wampanoag who enlisted in the rangers in 1744 had honed the
techniques of the prior generation when they battled Abenaki
peoples during Queen Anne’s and Governor Dummer’s War.
Tracking enemies, maneuvering under forest cover, and skir-
mishing in small units were the hallmarks of colonial Native
American warfare. On reconnaissance around Annapolis Royal,
Indian rangers gathered intelligence on opponents and then
used this information to harass them during nighttime raids on
their villages. The rangers also rounded up Acadian ringleaders
suspected of organizing resistance against British rule.21
In addition to their intimate understanding of the forest,
many of Gorham’s company were also adroit on water. Writing
to Gorham in 1746, Mascerene demonstrated his appreciation
for the particular contribution the rangers were making to the
British war effort. “Your people being for the most part both
soldiers, sailors and wood rangers,” he noted, they “were [well]
acquainted in the way of annoying the enemy we have to deal
with.” Gorham agreed. Acadia “was so cut and divided by water
that nothing but Whaleboats and Men used to them could gain
advantage over [the] Indians there; whose dependence lay so
much in the swiftness of their canoes.”22
Gorham was well acquainted with his whalemen’s dexterity.
Joseph Ralph had been the “endsman”—the man who steered
the boat and launched the harpoon—of an Indian whaleboat
crew on one of Gorham’s sloops. From 1744 until his death in
1749, Ralph soldiered for his old skipper in Gorham’s Rangers.
Before the war, corporal Jeremy Queach, one of the few Na-
tives awarded noncommissioned officer rank in the rangers,
worked as a whaler for Benjamin Bangs of Harwich. Another
21Boston News-Letter, 15 November 1744; Mascarene to the Lords of Trade, 25
September 1744; Grenier, First Way of War, pp. 74–75; Shirley, Memoirs of the
Principal Transactions, pp. 28–29.
22Correspondence of William Shirley, 1:339; Petition of John Gorham; Church, The
History of Philip’s War, p. 213.
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Nauset, Joseph Twiney, also from Harwich, was in the rangers
from 1748 through 1752, when the company was stationed at
Annapolis Royal and, thereafter, Halifax. During that time, he
amassed a considerable debt to Edward Winnet, the captain of
one of the ranger’s transports, from whom he had borrowed
money because, like others in the company, Twiney was an
indentured servant and so his wages were sent to his English
master back on Cape Cod. At the end of his enlistment, Twiney
had the choice of indenturing himself to Winnet as a whaler or
going to debtors’ prison. He chose whaling. If the connection
between whaling and the ranger service was not clear enough,
on 14 October 1744, Gorham and ten Indian rangers daringly
rowed their whaleboat up to an armed French warship entering
the harbor at Annapolis Royal. A whale surfaced nearby. The
whaling captain and Indian whalemen followed their instincts;
they attacked the whale instead of the ship.23
The force quickly earned a reputation as effective guerilla
fighters who instilled fear in their enemies, just as Mascerene
had hoped. Shortly after arriving at Annapolis Royal in 1744,
a Massachusetts newspaper reported that “Capt. Gorham who
commands a Company that went thither from this province, had
lately brought into that Garrison the scalps of three of the Cape
Sable’s or St. John’s Indians [Mi’kmaqs]; also a Papoose alive.”
In the autumn of 1749, the rangers sparked an international in-
cident when, unprovoked and in spite of a truce, Gorham’s unit
crossed into French-controlled territory, captured two Abenaki
peace envoys, and demanded at gunpoint that the Mi’kmaq of
23Joseph Ralph married Deborah Joel at the Indian meetinghouse in Yarmouth on
24 September 1727 (Vital Records of Yarmouth, Massachusetts, to the Year 1850, comp.
Robert M. Sherman and Ruth Wilder Sherman [Providence: Society of Mayflower
Descendants in Rhode Island, 1975]). For Ralph’s service on the Neptune, see John
Gorham’s “Waste Book”; for reference to Ralph as an “Indian Justice,” see “Vital
Records of the Towns of Eastham and Orleans,” Mayflower Descendant, various issues,
1901–35. For Queach, see Benjamin Bangs Diary, vol. 1: 1741–49, Massachusetts
Historical Society (MHS), Boston, entries for 19–20 September 1744; see also undated
(ca. 1746) muster roll of Gorham’s Rangers. For Twiney, see Nathaniel Stone, account
against Captain Joseph Winnet, 1751, Bourne Family, Massachusetts Military Papers,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. In early August 1751, John
Salusbury recalled how John Gorham set out in a boat and “killed a Porpoise in a
Whaleing manner” (Expeditions of Honour, pp. 115, 119). Seemingly apocryphal, the
incident with the French ship and the whale was mentioned alongside observations that
can be corroborated in other sources (see Boston News-Letter, 15 November 1744).
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the Saint John River region submit to British authority. That
same year, a party of Mi’kmaq ambushed a construction crew
on the outskirts of Halifax. Rather than the local militia, of-
ficials sent Gorham and his rangers in pursuit because they
could “fight them in their own way,” meaning they utilized
ranger tactics.24
The way in which the rangers fought attracted a good deal
of attention. Like Church decades before and Rogers a decade
later, Gorham eschewed massed-infantry tactics, whereby
soldiers in tight formation fired largely un-aimed volleys at the
opponent’s line, the norm in conventional European warfare.
Instead, he emphasized marksmanship, that is, shooting at
individual targets. The rangers’ waterborne operations were
also admired. A detachment from the Seventh Massachusetts
Regiment, including Indians from the rangers, was the first
unit ashore at Gabarus Bay on 4 May 1745, at the start of
the expedition to seize Louisbourg from the French. Led
by Gorham and using whaleboats and ranger tactics, the
detachment engaged two hundred French soldiers sent to
repel them. But it was the French force that was surprised
and quickly surrounded by Gorham’s smaller force. A New
Englander observing the mêlée recounted it.
We had but 100 landed, under Col. Gorham, who did not stay to draw
up in form, but surrounded the French, and kept popping at them,
kill’d 4 or 5 and wounded several, and took a great many prisoners. . . .
In landing we had 2 men wounded. The French say our Men fight
like Devils; for go which way they will they are popping at them like
true Indian hunters.
They fought like Indians because many of them were Indians.
Surviving records indicate that two out of every five privates
24New York Weekly Journal, 19 November 1744; Documents Relative to the Colonial
History of the State of New York, vol. 6, ed. John R. Brodhead and E. B. Callaghan
(Albany, 1855), pp. 478–84; New York Mercury, 5 June 1756; John Knox, An Historical
Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760,
3 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society,1914–16), 1:394–95; Roland-Michel Barrin de La
Galissoniere to Shirley, 26 June and 25 July 1749, in Report Concerning Canadian
Archives for the Year 1905, 3 vols. (Ottawa: S. E. Dawson, 1906), 2:54, app. N-303-
306; Boston News-Letter, 12 October 1749.
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in the Seventh Massachusetts were Native Americans. Like the
rangers, they were mostly Wampanoags from Cape Cod, as well
as from Plymouth and Bristol counties, Martha’s Vineyard, and
Nantucket.25
In addition to amphibious landings and skirmishing tactics,
Gorham and his Indian rangers frequently employed stealth
and subterfuge. Fluent in French, John Gorham convincingly
impersonated a Canadian officer on several occasions to gather
intelligence or take prisoners. Joseph Gorham, at the time a
lieutenant, and sixty rangers raided the Acadian settlement at
Cobequid in late 1749. The Abbé Jean-Louis Le Loutre (1709–
72), a leader of the Acadian resistance in the area, noted that
“Mr. Gorom came stealthily and at night, and carried off our
pastor and our four deputies. . . . he is ordered to seize upon all
the guns found in our houses, and consequently to reduce us to
a condition similar to that of the Irish.” Le Loutre understood
British intentions; the Acadians fought a bitter partisan struggle
against the English from the late 1740s through the 1750s.26
Captured, Assimilated, Reedemed—but
Not Rewarded
Like English soldiers (as well as many civilians), Indians from
southern New England who were fighting in the colonial wars
were occasionally captured by French-allied Indians. A more
25John Gorham, Journal [Fort Sackville, Nova Scotia], 9–16 September 1749, John
Gorham Papers. Gorham’s rank in the British army was captain. His provincial rank
was lieutenant colonel. Some sources confuse him with his father, a colonel. On the
landing, see Boston Evening Post, 20 May 1745. On the composition of the Seventh
Regiment, see Charles Hudson, “Louisbourg Soldiers,” New England Historical and
Genealogical Register 25 (1871): 60–62, and “Lt. Colonel John Gorham’s Regiment,”
20 November 1745, William Pepperell Papers (1664–1782), microfilm reel 2, MHS.
From the rolls, 34.6 percent of the regiment’s men can be identified as either Indians,
mulattoes, or mustees. If one excludes officers and noncommissioned officers, Indians
made up 41.4 percent of all privates.
26Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal of the Acadian French, 1755–1768, ed.
T. B. Akins, Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia,
vol. 2 (Halifax: Charles Annand, 1869), pp. 231–32. For information on Le Loutre,
see Gérard Finn, “Le Loutre, Jean-Louis,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online
(University of Toronto / Université Laval), http://www.biographi.ca. For more on the
insurgency led by Le Loutre, see Grenier, The Far Reaches of Empire, pp. 138–76,
and John Gorham to William Shirley, 4 October 1746, John Gorham Papers.
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complex cultural phenomenon than can be fully treated here,
mourning war practices were common to cultures throughout
the colonial Northeast and often determined the fate of war
captives, who were apprehended to avenge or stand in for
deceased loved ones. Captives could be ritually tortured and
killed to assuage their captors’ grief; adopted into captors’ fam-
ilies and community to replace lost members; or ransomed to
French colonists in Canada, by this time an important source
of money and trade goods for many Native communities.27 The
numerous narratives written by former captives are a valuable
source for historians, anthropologists, and literary scholars, for
they provide rich descriptions of intercultural encounters as
well as important, albeit problematic, ethnographic accounts
of indigenous culture. They are limited, however, for all were
prepared by Euro-Americans, none by Indians. Still, Indians
who were captured and later redeemed did submit petitions
for back pay and pension requests to provincial authorities, and
these documents raise crucial questions about citizenship, race
and identity, the role of Indian family members in securing
the release of captured loved ones, and the responsibility of
provincial governments to their Native subjects.
On 6 July 1749, the Boston News-Letter printed a letter
detailing English efforts to redeem men and women captured
and imprisoned in Canada during King George’s War. Tacked
to the end was a notice: “We also hear, that there are nine Cape
Cod Indians at Canada, five of which were taken at Annapolis
Royal, who were under the Command of Col. Gorham in the
year 1745; some of them are sold as Slaves to the Indians;
that they are very desirous of being redeemed.”28 In May
1745, approximately five hundred French soldiers, Acadian
27Jon Parmenter, “After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in Colonial
North American Campaigns, 1676–1760,” William and Mary Quarterly 64 (2007): 39–
82; Peter J. Way, “The Cutting Edge of Culture: British Soldiers Encounter Native
Americans in the French and Indian War,” in Empire and Others: British Encounters
with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850, ed. Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 131–35; Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats:
The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755–1763 (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2006).
28Boston News-Letter, 6 July 1749.
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militiamen, and their Native American allies had attacked the
garrison at Annapolis Royal and seized the Indian rangers as
well as English crewmen from two provincial supply schooners,
Seaflower and Montague. Over the next two months, in a
journey of more than five hundred miles, the prisoners were
marched across Nova Scotia to present-day New Brunswick,
up the Saint John River and overland to Quebec, where they
arrived on 25 July. All of the English captives and one Native
American soldier were imprisoned in the city; the remaining
captive Indians were re-adorned in the clothing and hairstyles
of their Abenaki and Huron captors and dispersed into Indian
communities around Quebec. Phineas Stevens encountered
several of the captured rangers while on a diplomatic mission
to Canada. He concluded that they despaired of ever being
redeemed. Stevens wrote, they “take it very hard that they are
not treated as the rest of King George’s subjects,” suggesting
that they felt the English had an obligation to secure their
release yet had abandoned them because they were Indians.29
The fate of the five captured rangers can be traced in sur-
viving records. Two living in Native American villages began as
“slaves” but in time, like many Anglo-American captives, were
fully assimilated into the Indian communities in which they
resided, where they chose to stay rather than return to New En-
gland after the war. Isaac Peck, a Wampanoag, remained among
the Abenaki at the Saint Francis mission at Odanak, where
he converted to Catholicism and took a wife. There he would
have encountered men he knew from his days in Gorham’s
company. Three of his Pigwacket comrades—Captain Sam,
Sabbatis, and Keysor—relocated their families to the mission
rather than returning to New England. Another captive ranger,
Philip Will, was a tall, lanky fourteen-year-old when he was
captured in 1745. Like many other rangers, he was an inden-
tured Wampanoag servant, probably a Mashpee, who had been
raised in an English household. At his master’s home in Barn-
stable, he learned to read and write English before going to
Nova Scotia with the rangers. Adopted by the Arosaguntacook
29Mass. Archives, 38a:148.
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(Androscoggin), a band of Eastern Abenaki who lived on the
southern Maine coast, over time the child-soldier grew into
manhood, took a new name, and eventually became the band’s
sachem. In this capacity, he put his literacy to good use in
negotiating with colonial officials over land disputes between
his adoptive tribe and English settlers who had invaded the
region after the war.30
Other rangers, however, clearly wished to return home.
Jacob Chammock, from the Herring Pond reservation in Ply-
mouth, Massachusetts, was held by the French in Canada. Un-
successfully attempting to escape several times, he was finally
released after two years. Peter Dogamus, despite being one
of the rangers’ most experienced warriors, was likewise appre-
hended. Savagely beaten by his captors during the trek from
Nova Scotia to Canada, he resided in an Indian village near
Quebec, probably the small Huron community at Lorette, for
the next five years. According to his later pension request, his
status there remained akin to that of a servant or slave, which, as
other evidence suggests, was not uncommon. Most captive Na-
tive American soldiers seem to have been treated more harshly
than their white counterparts.31
The families of these and other captured Indian rangers
barraged Gorham with petitions, urging him to redeem their
30For Peck, see Joseph Gorham, “Return of Troops, Rangers from Nova Scotia,”
23 February 1748, Gilder Lehrman Collection; Emma Lewis Coleman, New England
Captives Carried to Canada, 2 vols. (Boston, 1897; repr. 2008), 2:402. For Will, see
George A. Wheeler and Henry W. Wheeler, History of Brunswick, Topsham, and
Harpswell (Boston, 1878), p. 3.
31The account of Dogamus’s capture is taken from his pension request, Mass.
Archives, 73:744, and The Journal of Captain William Pote, Jr., during his Captivity
in the French and Indian War from May 1745 to August 1747 (New York, 1896),
pp. 59–60, 62–63, 86. Although Pote does not mention Dogamus by name, he does
refer to Jacob Chammock and Caleb Popmonet and describes several other Indian
soldiers traveling with him. See also Mass. Archives, 91:139–41, 178–80; Collection
de Manuscrits Contenant Mémoires, et Autre Documents Historiques Relatifs à La
Nouvelle-France, Recueillis aux Archives de la Province de Québec, ou Copiés à
L’Étranger, vol. 3 (Quebec, 1884), pp. 488–89, 491; records in the Mass. Archives
that describe redeemed captive Indian soldiers reporting being treated as slaves or
servants include: Joseph Joseph (79:564); Nathan Joseph (84:302–20); John Pequet
(33:194–94a); Aaron Conkaney (84:317); Philip Metack (33:73); and Joseph Metack
(33:133,161–62, 224). The author would like to thank Andrew Pierce for the last two
citations.
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missing family members or to aid them directly or secure
the province’s financial assistance to alleviate the hardships
they suffered in the wake of their family member’s captivity
or death. Some even threatened legal action against Gorham.
Writing to Shirley in 1749 to request relief for “the Squas and
heirs,” Gorham complained that compensation for Mi’kmaq
scalps and prisoners taken during the 1744 siege of Annapolis
Royal was still outstanding. Prisoners and scalps had been sent
back to Massachusetts in expectation of the bounty the colony
had offered, but, the commander explained, “some clause” in
the statute’s wording had “delayed the payment.” When they
learned that they might not receive their bounties due to a
technicality, one that smacked of the deceitfulness that had
characterized land deals with the English over the years, the
rangers were livid. In a petition to the General Court, Gorham
stated that in early 1745 his company’s Indian members “De-
sired and Impowered” him to return to Massachusetts and
demand the bounties from the legislature.32
Southern New England Natives living under colonial juris-
diction had, by the 1740s, a long tradition of petitioning provin-
cial overseers, governors, and legislatures for redress. Far from
passive victims of colonial exploitation, the Indians persuaded
their overseers to mediate disputes with town and colony offi-
cials, and they were not above petitioning the Crown if local
governments proved unresponsive. Within a military context,
however, few provincial troops, despite famously viewing their
martial obligations contractually, would have thought them-
selves in possession of any form of power which they might
choose to assert or transfer. But Gorham’s language conveys
that understanding of a constitutive body (the Indian soldiers)
issuing an order to its representative (their commander). The
rangers’ “empowerment” of Gorham also reflected the consen-
sus model that characterized southern New England Native
politics. The group having come to a decision, their comman-
der, here assuming the role of a sachem, was compelled to
act on it. If he did not, as earlier colonial conflicts had amply
32Petition of John Gorham.
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demonstrated, Indian soldiers would display their displeasure
by deserting or refusing to reenlist.33
The scalp bounties were not only a potent recognition of
Indians’ war prowess; they were for many rangers and their
families the only money they would receive for their service.
Provincial muster rolls show that about one-third of New En-
gland Indians in the armed forces were indentured servants.
Their masters received their pay. Perhaps another third were
deeply in debt and signed over or promised their wages to
creditors, in some cases even before they had deployed. Thus,
the majority of the region’s Native American soldiers received
little or nothing in hand for having risked their lives. By law,
masters and creditors could attach base pay but could not touch
what was earned beyond wages, including enlistment bonuses,
plunder, premiums for captives, and scalp bounties.34
Before the General Court had a chance to hear Gorham’s
petition on behalf of his Indian soldiers, the region was again
swept up in military preparations. The distracted assembly, con-
sumed with the forthcoming siege of Louisbourg in the summer
of 1745, never returned to the petition, which was subsequently
destroyed in a fire along with Gorham’s accompanying docu-
mentation, and for the next seven years the bureaucratic pro-
cess continued to unravel. Many Indian families entitled to a
share of the scalp bounties were convinced that Gorham had
been duplicitous in the affair. Desperate to escape the con-
stant pestering of the “squaws,” Gorham submitted additional
petitions. But the company was in limbo, caught in a transition
(1747–48) between a provincial auxiliary unit and a regular
33Mandell, Behind the Frontier, p. 157; Alden T. Vaughan, Transatlantic Encoun-
ters: American Indians in Britain, 1500–1776 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2006), pp. 176–79, 313; and Mark D. Walters, “Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705–
1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British
North America,” Osgoode Hall Law Review 33 (1995): 785–829. Mohegans throughout
the colonial period often challenged the authority of their Anglo-American comman-
ders. They refused to fight for the English for more than two years during Queen
Anne’s War over the same issue facing Gorham’s company in 1745—nonpayment of
scalp bounties.
34“Rolls of Enlisted Men . . . [1745–1749],” and “Transfers of Wages [1748–1749],”
French and Indian War Papers, Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, Conn. See
also n. 7.
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Fig. 3.—John Gorham placed this notice about scalp bounties in the Boston
Gazette, 14 April 1747, to notify rangers and the families of deceased or imprisoned
company members that he was having difficulty obtaining payment for Mi’kmaq
scalps they had taken in 1744. Image courtesy American Antiquarian Society.
army force. During this period, Gorham footed the company’s
expenses, expecting that he would be reimbursed, and so he
lacked the wherewithal to compensate the families of rangers
who had been killed or captured (see fig. 3).
By 1751, when the assembly finally took up Gorham’s new
petitions, his company had already been absorbed into the
British army. The parsimonious Massachusetts legislature took
the easy out, claiming that the scalp bounties were no longer
within its jurisdiction. Moreover, King George’s War was
over, and, aside from a few frontier garrisons, the Bay Colony
had recalled and disbanded its provincial forces. Its mission
now aligned more with imperial goals than with those of
Massachusetts, Gorham’s unit stayed on in Nova Scotia.
Meanwhile, having been absent from Massachusetts for the
better part of six years, Gorham was losing clout. His father
had died in 1746, and so John no longer had Shirley’s ear.
Disheartened by his repeated failures with the provincial
government, Gorham petitioned his newly ordained military
superiors in England to clear his accounts relating to the
company. Before a settlement was reached, Gorham died (in
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late 1751).35 The bounties went unpaid. The Indian families
from the Cape never received the money owed them.
Unpaid bounties aside, in January 1749, the deluge of pe-
titions and requests from the rangers’ family members, none
of which survive, spurred both Crown and province to take a
greater interest in the plight of those who had been captured
and were languishing in Canada. Lieutenant Governor Spencer
Phips organized a committee to investigate the matter. Led by
Thomas Berry, a judge and legislator from Ipswich and mem-
ber of the Governor’s Council, the committee recommended
that Phips write to the governor of Canada to inform him that
“the Indians Captivated from Nova Scotia in the late War,
are Subjects of the King of Great Britain having been born
within this province.” Therefore, Berry continued, they should
“equally enjoy the privileges” thereof, and the French should
“forthwith give Liberty, and Signifie it to any and every Indian
(that may still remain in Canada Captivated as aforesaid) his
leave for them to return to this Province and by no means to
detain them against their wills” nor continue to allow them to
be “sold for Slaves.”36 Agreeing to an exchange, French officials
began the task of locating Indian captives within their borders.
Despite their efforts, only one Indian ranger, Peter Doga-
mus, declared himself ready to return. Along with a number of
Anglo-American captives desiring repatriation, he was brought
to Fort Saint-Frederick (later Crown Point) in July 1750. A few
weeks later, the individuals were exchanged for French pris-
oners held by the English. Dogamus then made his way back
to New England, and in January 1751 he was in Barnstable
seeking assistance from Melatiah Bourne, Gorham’s cousin and
business agent in New England. Bourne helped Dogamus, now
more than sixty years old, obtain a pension from the province
35For more on the bounty issue, see John Gorham to Mascerene, November 1749,
John Gorham Papers; Boston Post-Boy, 9 March 1752; and John Gorham Petition.
36A royal proclamation arrived from Whitehall a month later echoing the substance
of Berry’s report (Mass. Archives, 31:686, 692). Gorham notes in his 1749 petition to the
Massachusetts General Court that he had been receiving these requests and petitions
from Indian families for several years and further mentions that the accompanying
documentation submitted with his later petitions was destroyed in a courthouse fire.
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based on his forty-plus years of service and the suffering he
had endured as a captive in Canada. In his pension request
to Phips, Dogamus, with Bourne’s help, described himself as
having “grown old & spent great parts of his life in ye Ser-
vice.” Claiming he was “not able to support himself,” he asked
Phips to grant him an allowance. Hardly treated like a subject
of the king or an inhabitant of the province entitled to certain
rights, as Berry had recommended two years earlier, Dogamus
encountered an assembly only slightly less tight fisted than the
one Gorham had petitioned. Granted no back pay for his time
in captivity, Dogamus was awarded only £6 per annum, one-
quarter to one-third of what a provincial soldier earned in a
nine-month deployment.37
“Scouring the Country of the Deluded French”
During the Seven Years War, Gorham’s Rangers was the
brutal fist of British imperialism in the Maritimes. Generally
portrayed as early “special forces” or frontier super-soldiers,
colonial rangers in that conflict, especially Roger’s Rangers, are
often highly romanticized. The truth is far from glamorous.
The role the British army assigned to Gorham’s Rangers was to
terrorize, persecute, and deport civilian populations—Acadians
and Mi’Kmaq in Nova Scotia and current-day New Brunswick
and, later, Canadians around Quebec. Functioning more of-
ten than not as an occupation force battling a loosely orga-
nized guerilla insurgency, the rangers were both feared and
renowned for their cruel treatment of civilians and captives as
well as for the devastation they wrought in a series of puni-
tive, scorched-earth campaigns. By the era’s European military
standards, the unit did little real fighting, although it did par-
ticipate in a number of crucial operations during the war—the
taking of Fort Beauséjour in 1755, the assault on Louisbourg
in 1758, the siege of Quebec in 1759 (in which they figured
prominently), and in 1762 the expedition to Havana, where
37Mass. Archives, 73:744. Evidence suggests Indians received less than white vet-
erans, perhaps because Natives could draw on tribal funds managed by reservation
overseers.
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most of the company died. On these occasions, they served
alongside other ranger companies, as many as five or six work-
ing together in a corps, as well as with British army regulars.
But unlike Gorham’s Rangers, these other units had no Native
Americans.38
Ambush, stealth, surprise raids, scalping, and terrorizing civil-
ians continued to characterize the company’s tactics. In Febru-
ary 1756, the rangers under Joseph Gorham attempted their
most elaborate deception. Wearing captured uniforms and im-
personating French soldiers and their Indian allies, Gorham
and his men sailed a captured French sloop up the Saint
John River in present-day New Brunswick to infiltrate enemy-
controlled territory, gather information, and take prisoners.
Four months later, on 10 June 1756, on assignment to root
out Acadian resistance in southwestern Nova Scotia, Gorham
dispatched a detachment of Native American soldiers to recon-
noiter an area along the banks of the Pubnico River. A small
party of Acadian guerillas fired on them. The rangers caught
one of the men—whom they killed and scalped—before burn-
ing all the nearby houses and crops in retaliation. And on 1
July 1759, during the siege of Quebec, Joseph Gorham and the
rangers ambushed a party of enemy Indians who attempted
to surprise the British encampment at Île d’Orléans, capturing
and scalping nine of them.39
Gorham’s Rangers was also instrumental in Le Grand
Dérangement, or the Acadian Removal. Imperial officials or-
dered the French-speaking Catholic Acadians expelled from
Nova Scotia in 1755 because of their perceived disloyalty and
in order to make room for Protestant English colonists. Aiding
regular troops, who had been recruited largely in New En-
gland, rangers rounded up thousands of Acadians from Nova
Scotia and present-day New Brunswick between 1755 and 1760
who were then deported to other British colonies and later
38Gorham attempted to re-form the unit in 1763 (see Joseph Gorham [to Melatiah
Bourne?], 3 September 1763, and Recruitment Account of Lieutenant William Barron
[1763], Bourne Family Papers, 1687–1791, Houghton Library).
39Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal, pp. 296–98; New York Mercury, 5 July
1756; Knox, An Historical Journal, 1:394–95 and 3:343–44.
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Louisiana (where they became known as Cajuns). Some, hop-
ing to stay, took loyalty oaths, which proved ineffective. Others
evaded British troops for weeks, months, or years, while still
others fought back in a desperate insurgency. Especially in such
cases, rangers were employed “in scouring the country of the
deluded French who had unfortunately fallen under the bann
of British policy,” remembered one witness.40
Even before the British ordered the Acadians deported, they
lived in fear of the rangers. Uncooperative Acadian families,
labeled “malcontents” by Shirley, often had their houses and
fields burnt by Gorham’s company. As early as the winter of
1746, years before the actual removals, rumors spread among
Acadian communities that the rangers would be evicting them
from their homes. In September 1749, Gorham wrote that
when the rangers, then at the head of Chebucto Bay (later Hal-
ifax), ran short on supplies, they pillaged French farmsteads in
search of peas, beef, and mutton, requisitioned sawn lumber to
build rafts, and seized canoes for transportation. As on many
previous occasions, they also “caught a french [sic] man” and
“obliged him” to act as a guide. “All ye Inhabitants seem to
be mutch frightne’d in being robbed by the Indians” in the
company, Gorham reported, and “could not be prevailed upon
to Give us any assistance but by [use] of Force.” When the
rangers passed through one hamlet, Gorham noted, not sur-
prisingly, that old men, women, and children cowered in their
presence.41
More so than during King George’s War, during the Acadian
Removal and the French and Indian War, Gorham’s Rangers
operated as a specialized amphibious strike force. Attacking
suddenly and without warning from the sea, they assailed com-
munities along the coast and, traveling upriver, struck at inland
40Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, pp. 140–58; Faragher, A Great and Noble Scheme,
pp. 397–415; Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal, p. 141.
41Gorham, Journal [Fort Sackville, Nova Scotia]; John Gorham to Shirley, 15
November 1746, Documentary History of the State of Maine, 11:344; Grenier, The
Far Reaches of Empire, p. 132. One observer noted that to the Acadian inhabitants,
Gorham’s Rangers were “far more terrible than European soldiers” (W. Bollan to Duke
of Newcastle, 19 August 1747, and Shirley to Duke of Newcastle, 27 February 1746,
Documentary History of the State of Maine, 11:314–15, 387–88).
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hamlets as well. Using their ubiquitous whaleboats, they de-
scended on an Acadian hamlet near Canso on the evening of
31 July 1757, surrounded it in the pre-dawn hours, and at first
light utterly destroyed it. In September and October 1758, the
rangers led a two-hundred-fifty man expedition to Cape Sable
in southwestern Nova Scotia, near present-day Yarmouth. As-
cending the Tusket, Pubnico, and Chebogue Rivers in their
whaleboats, they expelled the remaining Acadians from the re-
gion. Then, in late October through November, Gorham’s unit
joined a force of over fifteen hundred soldiers that once again
ascended the Saint John River in search of Acadian refugees.
Also charged with erasing the Acadian presence from the land-
scape, they torched farms, houses, even whole villages, killed
livestock, and confiscated or destroyed crops. Given the rangers’
expertise at water-borne operations, in May 1759, Major Gen-
eral James Wolfe ordered them to row up the Saint Lawrence
River on an advance reconnaissance mission, during which they
secured landing sites and several strategic points before the
larger invasion force arrived in June to lay siege to Quebec.42
In the aftermath of one amphibious landing that year, a British
officer commented that
at day-break, [Gorham’s detachment] got into their boats, and rowed
to [St.] Paul’s bay; when they came within reach of the shore, they
were saluted with a shower of musketry, by which one man was killed,
and eight were wounded; . . . before the villagers could load again,
the boats were grounded, and the troops instantly pushed on shore,
charged, and routed the wretched inhabitants.43
42Joseph Gorham, “A report of the proceedings in the Schooner Monckton, Be-
ginning July 22, 1757,” Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif. (citation courtesy of
Geoffrey Plank); Joseph Gorham to Captain Cathcart, 23 December 1757, Rare Books
and Manuscripts Collection, Boston Public Library; “Nova Scotia-Major Morris Report-
1758,” Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 9 (“Aspinwall Papers”),
4th ser. (1871), pp. 222–36. For Wolfe, see Orderly Book, 30 April–13 September
1759, Major General Wolfe’s General Orders, Townshend Papers, vol. 7, Northcliffe
Collection, Archives Canada; Knox, Historical Journal, 2:22; Joseph Gorham, “Account
from Isle aux Coudre, dated August 16th 1759, of the Proceedings of the Company
of Rangers Commanded by Capt. Gorham,” Boston News-Letter, 6 September 1759;
James Wolfe to Robert Monckton, 17 May 1759, Monckton Papers, vol. 22, Northcliffe
Collection.
43Knox, Historical Journal, 2:38.
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Gorham’s Rangers, along with companies from Rogers’s
corps, participated in the second siege of Louisbourg in June
and July 1758. Over five hundred strong, the six ranger com-
panies were still a mere 5 percent of the total force, but they
faced a challenging initial assault—a difficult and dangerous
amphibious landing, on a rocky, craggy outcropping in Gabarus
Bay, in heavy fog and high surf. Raked with French gunfire
and sprayed with canisters of grapeshot, a combined force of
rangers, British light infantry, and highlanders rowed to their
destination and waded ashore. Scaling a rock-strewn escarp-
ment, they flanked several enemy defensive positions; then
they poured into the French entrenchments, killing more than
a hundred defenders and taking dozens prisoner. After this ini-
tial assault, the rangers receded to the edges of action, where
they periodically skirmished with Indians, an occupation that
made better use of their talents than digging trenches, con-
structing siege batteries, or hauling artillery, tasks required
of those besieging European gunpowder fortresses. Still, their
effectiveness was not to be denied. Calling them “savages,”
French soldiers fled at the mere sight of Gorham’s company.
Their fear was warranted. White and Indian members of the
ranger companies killed and scalped both European and Na-
tive prisoners during the siege. Although British officers were
shocked, the governor of Nova Scotia praised the rangers’
performance. “I have particular pleasure in assuring you,” he
informed the press, “that the Companies of Rangers raised
in New-England behaved at [the] Landing so as to do great
Honour to themselves, and the country they come from.” He
made no reference to them killing prisoners and mutilating
corpses.44
44The total force was eleven thousand strong (Knox, Historical Journal, 1:32, 393–
94). Forty-two members of this combined landing force were killed in the assault, and
twenty were wounded. See The Journal of Jeffery Amherst, ed. J. Clarence Webster
(Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1931), pp. 49–51; James Abercromby to Robert Monckton,
23 June 1758, and entries for 8 June, in “Journal of the Siege of Louisbourg 1758,”
Monckton Papers, vol. 9. For newspaper accounts of the assault, see French and
Indian War Notices Abstracted from Colonial Newspapers, vol. 3: 1 January 1758–17
September 1759, ed. Armand Fransis Lucier (Lanham, Md.: Heritage Books, 2007),
pp. 80, 87–88, 91, 98, 126.
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“White Adventurers Familiar with the Forest”
By the mid-1750s Gorham’s Rangers was not the company
it had once been. Its numbers fluctuated greatly—ranging
between fifty and one hundred twenty-five. In addition, the
composition of the unit’s rank and file shifted from all Indians
in 1744 to a multiracial unit in which whites held the majority
by 1762, with Indian participation dipping to as low as 5 per-
cent. In a 1749 petition to the Massachusetts legislature, John
Gorham mused over the high rate of attrition suffered by his
original Indian unit. The company “was reduced by being taken
Prisoner, kill’d, Drowned, and Carried off by the fatigues of that
hard and Dangerous service, That there is not one Quarter of
said Company now surviving.” The number of Indians shrank
further during the unit’s second deployment, yet there were
still enough Native Americans in the company that in August
1749 Gorham was referred to by a government functionary in
Halifax as the “Indian Coll[onel]” and as “Coll. Gorham who
Commands the Indian Rangers in our service.” Still, during that
period the proportion of Indian privates in Gorham’s Rangers
dropped from 75 percent in late 1746, to 60 percent in early
1748, to just 28 percent by early 1750. Most new recruits were
Anglo-Americans, trained in ranger techniques by Gorham or
the other officers. However, despite its evolving makeup, in
the first half of the 1750s, periodic reinfusions of Indian men
assured that Native Americans remained a core element of the
company.45
45Petition of John Gorham. Gorham’s 1746 muster list shows only twenty-two In-
dian privates in the rangers and the company down to forty-two men total. For the
functionary who called him the “Indian colonel,” see Expeditions of Honour, p. 141.
Gorham refers to sending recruiters to Barnstable County, the company’s primary
recruiting area (Gorham to Melatiah Bourne, 13 December 1748, John Gorham Pa-
pers). Records showing the composition of the rangers and related units are: undated
(ca. 1746) muster roll of Gorham’s Rangers; Joseph Gorham, “Return of Troops”;
“Names officers & men on Comd when took 3 frenchmen.” See also “Lt. Colonel John
Gorham’s Regiment”; Hudson, “Louisbourg Soldiers,” pp. 60–62; Charles Lawrence to
John Winslow, 23 September 1755, and Henry Dobson to John Winslow, 22 Septem-
ber 1755, “Journal of Colonel John Winslow of the Provincial Troops, While Engaged
in Removing the Acadian French Inhabitants from Grand Pre . . . in the Autumn of
the Year 1755,” Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. 3 (1883), pp. 71–
196. For Danks’s Rangers, see “A Roll of the Ranging Company at Fort Cumberland,”
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Also gone by 1750 were the Indian veterans who had been
so vital to the company’s early success. Peter Dogamus had
languished in a Huron village near Quebec before, his fighting
days over, he was redeemed. Veteran ranger Caleb Popmonet,
from a leading Mashpee Wampanoag family, was captured with
Dogamus but later managed to escape. He never returned to
the company. Corporal Jeremiah Queach had apparently had
enough of war after 1746; he chose not to reenlist. Joseph
Ralph, the whaleboat commander, died in 1749. The most sig-
nificant loss occurred in the spring of 1750. Captain Sam, al-
ready disgruntled that his daughter was detained in service to a
Massachusetts household, grew disillusioned that the promises
made to him and the other Pigwacket members were still un-
fulfilled. After seven years of loyal service, the highly valued
guide, translator, and negotiator deserted. He led his people
back to Maine to live among a related Abenaki band. Then,
with his young daughter and others in tow, he removed to the
Jesuit mission at Saint Francis.46 Gone too was the company’s
founder and namesake, John Gorham. In 1751, having con-
tracted smallpox, he died in England.
The company’s anglicization accelerated when it came under
imperial control in 1748. Although company muster rolls do
not survive for the period after 1750, other records suggest that
New England Indians continued to serve in Gorham’s Rangers
while at the same time men from throughout the British Em-
pire and larger Atlantic World were replacing many of the unit’s
Yankee members. The names of Scotsmen, Irishmen, and—
the very people the rangers had been sent to displace—even
Frenchmen predominated. British-born career army officers
now recruited enlistees not at Cape Cod but at Halifax, Boston,
4 August 1758, French and Indian War Collection, American Antiquarian Society
(AAS), Worcester, Mass.; and “A List of Capt. Benoni Danks Company of Rangers at
Fort Cumberland,” 20 February 1761, Massachusetts Collection, AAS. Danks’s com-
pany seems to have never contained more than a dozen or so Indians total.
46Joseph Gorham, “Return of Troops.” Popmonet, along with fifty-five other Mash-
pee Indians, signed a 1753 petition to the Massachusetts government (Mass. Archives,
32:427). The Pigwackets later lived among the Arosaguntacook (Androscoggin) (Docu-
mentary History of the State of Maine, 12:60, 71–74).
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New London, or New York. Typical of these new recruits
was Cornelius Cavanaugh, an Irish immigrant who came to
North America with the British army in 1740. Living a transient
existence over the next two decades, he married and enlisted
in the armed forces twice, doing garrison duty in Maine and
serving a spell in Gorham’s ranger corps in the 1750s.47
Few of the new Indian recruits were Wampanoags, as most of
the original members had been, but were from other tribes in
southern New England. Jonathan Babesuck and John Wom-
squam, Christian Nipmuc Indians from Natick, had served
under the Gorhams in the Seventh Massachusetts Regiment
at Louisbourg. They joined the ranger company after 1746.
Babesuck died while enlisted several years later. Abraham
Speen, a Natick leader, was a member of the unit in 1747
and 1748. A Mohegan from Connecticut referred to only as
Jaquish was in Nova Scotia with the rangers in 1755. Later that
same year, fourteen Indians, including Mohegans, Pequots, and
Niantics from Connecticut, as well as Wampanoags, were trans-
ferred to Gorham’s company from the Fiftieth Regiment, one
of only two British army regiments raised in New England
during the war. As late as 1761, unit officers were still
culling Indians from provincial regiments. That year, Captain
Ebenezer Marrow pulled two Wampanoag veterans, Thomas
Tockanot and Eliakim Nehoman, out of their Massachusetts
regiment and transferred them to the rangers. Similar to other
Indians in Gorham’s Rangers, Tockanot, from Martha’s Vine-
yard, was a twenty-seven-year-old experienced whaleman who
had served previously in the provincial army. Presumably the
rangers did not suit him, for he deserted almost immedi-
ately. Four others accompanied him. One was Peter Washanks,
a twenty-four-year-old Wampanoag from Rhode Island and
likewise a provincial veteran. He was also the grandson and
namesake—and thus literally heir—of one of the war captains
who had led Benjamin Church’s first Indian company during
47Cornelius Cavenaugh memorial to William Shirley, 6 January 1755, Mass.
Archives, 74:313. Another individual typical of later recruits was John Hall, a twenty-
year-old mariner and recent immigrant from Ireland (Boston Evening Post, 29
September 1760).
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King Philip’s War. The other three deserters reflected more
recent changes to the company: two were newly arrived Irish
immigrants; one was an Anglo-American who had been born in
Nova Scotia.48
By the mid-1750s the company’s diverse assemblage of in-
dividuals reflected the ethnic and racial mix of the British
Atlantic: members of various Indian tribes—some of mixed
African and Native ancestry, several identified as negroes—
along with various Irish, English, and Scots recruits from
Europe as well as Acadians and New England Yankees. This
diversity made it difficult for observers, both European and
Native, to categorize the unit. For example, a report of intelli-
gence gathered by French-allied Native scouts and intercepted
by Rogers’s Rangers in 1755 described Gorham’s Rangers as the
“bad subjects” or riffraff of the colonies and as “white adventur-
ers familiar with the forest.” The account mistakenly identified
the Native American members as Stockbridge Mohicans who,
they also erroneously noted, had replaced the earlier “Mo-
hawks.” Perhaps two hundred Native Americans from southern
New England cycled through the company over its nineteen-
year existence, but the vast majority were Wampanoag; no
Mohicans or Iroquois are present in any record relating to
Gorham’s Rangers. Inaccurate observations such as these, cou-
pled with popular stereotypes, have opened a space for some
wildly speculative characterizations. A case in point is an oft-
cited 1954 article by George T. Bates, found in the Collections
of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, which describes Gorham’s
48For Babesuck (misspelled “Bathersick”) and Womsquam, see “Names officers &
men on Comd when took 3 frenchmen,” and “Part of Three Companies All At Present
Under the Col’s Command and Doe Duty in Town,” 20 November 1745, Pepperell
Papers; “Journal of Colonel John Winslow,” pp. 192–93. For Speen, see Gorham,
“Return of Troops, Rangers from Nova Scotia.” For Jaquish, see “The Petition of
the Selectmen of Worcester,” 1 July 1756, Massachusetts Collection, AAS. Tockanot
served as an indentured whaleman for Cornelius Bassett in 1755 and was in Captain
Jeremiah Mayhew’s company stationed in Nova Scotia in 1759. Nehoman was an
experienced soldier, first serving in Captain Zacheus Mayhew’s company in 1758 and
then as a corporal in Captain Jeremiah Mayhew’s company in 1759, before he enlisted
in the provincial service again in 1761 and was exchanged for a white soldier and, like
Tockanot, wound up in Gorham’s Rangers (Mass. Archives, 33:269–73, 366; 97:140,
277, 279, 470–71).
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Rangers as “mostly full-blooded, practically naked Mohawk In-
dians, with a sprinkling of half-clad half-bloods.” They were
“devils incarnate,” according to Bates, “harrowing and hair-
raising” to the sedate and lily-white English men, women, and
children penned up with them inside Fort Anne in the 1740s.
Such prejudiced nonsense has colored historical scholarship
about Gorham’s Rangers down to the present day.49
In truth, however, race did matter to those who com-
manded the rangers, for they believed that Indians were racially
predisposed to military service. When the younger Gorham
assumed command in 1753, he redoubled efforts to enlist Na-
tive Americans. In 1755–56, he exchanged white rangers from
his company for Indian men culled from different New En-
gland provincial and British imperial units stationed in Nova
Scotia. Noting “that Service [ranging] Can Never be so well
performed by any as by real Indians,” Charles Lawrence,
the British governor of Nova Scotia, backed Gorham’s policy.
The rangers were renowned for their long-range mobility and
their expertise in reconnaissance. But they were also notorious
for driving Acadians and Mi’kmaq from their homes, taking
hostages, and destroying crops, settlements, and farms. These
were the “Perticular Designs” for which Gorham claimed In-
dians were so “usefull”; this was the kind of work for which
Lawrence felt “real Indians” were best suited.50 Yet Gorham’s
49George T. Bates, “John Gorham 1709–1751, an Outline of His Activities in Nova
Scotia 1744–1751,” Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. 30 (1954),
p. 29.
50For Anglo-American soldiers disturbed by the brutality of both enemy and allied
Indians, see “Diary of Jabez Fitch,” Mayflower Descendant 10 (1908): 187; Mayflower
Descendant 5 (1903): 242; Way, “The Cutting Edge of Culture,” pp. 124, 131–38; Cor-
respondence of William Shirley, 2:466, 553; Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal,
p. 157. Communications between William Shirley and officers in Nova Scotia during
the Acadian Removal clearly reveal this perceived racial preference (John Gorham to
John Winslow, 22 September 1755, in “Journal of Colonel John Winslow,” pp. 71–196;
Charles Lawrence to John Winslow, 23 September 1755, and Henry Dobson to John
Winslow, 22 September 1755, in “Journal of Colonel John Winslow of the provincial
troops, while engaged in the siege of Fort Beausejour, in the summer and autumn of
1755 . . . ,” Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, vol. 4 [1885], pp. 113–246;
Plank, An Unsettled Conquest, pp. 49–50, 69, 71, 79, 82). The British were not above
using Indians to induce the same fear that French-sponsored Indian raids induced
in English settler populations (Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War
Transformed Early America [New York: W. W. Norton, 2008]).
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ranger corps was still assigned these “savage” tasks long af-
ter Native Americans had dwindled to a small minority within
the company. Later, British observers could not fathom why
white colonial rangers behaved so “savagely.” Only by under-
standing the evolution of Gorham’s Rangers from an Indian
unit—expected to carry out “savage” acts because they were
Indians—to a predominantly Anglo-American one, still carrying
out the same acts of violence, can these responses be properly
understood.
In 1747 John Gorham traveled to England and convinced
the British high command that his rangers should become an
independent company in the British army. Thereafter, between
1749 and 1751, leaders in Nova Scotia created an entire ranger
corps, consisting of at least seven companies, all modeled on
Gorham’s unit although staffed by Anglo-Americans. In 1749,
an advertisement pitched to potential recruits noted that the
new companies would “traverse the woods in pursuit of the
Indians, in the same manner that Col. Gorham does with his
rangers”; another from 1751 announced that a new military
contingent would be established “in the same manner as Cap-
tain Gorham’s company of Rangers.” Thus did the tactics pio-
neered by the company’s original Indian rangers, then taught to
the Gorhams and other Anglo-American members of the com-
pany, become widely disseminated among British and provin-
cial troops in the northeastern borderlands—five years before
Rogers’s Rangers were formed.51
“A Singular Mark of the Most Unheard-of Cruelty”
Paul Mascerene, General James Wolfe, and, especially, Lord
Jeffery Amherst, the commander of British forces in North
America during the second half of the Seven Years War, all
51Boston Gazette, 23 February 1748; New York Gazette, 23 October 1749; Boston
Post-Boy, 27 May 1751. They were led, in turn, by Captain Francis Bartelo, Major
George Scott, Captain (and later Major) Joseph Gorham, Captain Charles Proctor and,
from New England, Major Ezekiel Gilman, Captain William Clapham, and Captain
Benoni Danks. Scott in particular went on to organize and lead British light infantry
units (Beamish Murdoch, History of Nova Scotia, or Acadie, vol. 2 [Halifax, 1866], pp.
162–63, 190; Expeditions of Honour, pp. 82–86).
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despised Indians but tolerated them as rangers because, the au-
thorities believed, they terrified enemy Indians and Canadians
more effectively than did white soldiers. Although primary
sources written by Mi’kmaqs and Acadians are extremely rare,
their impressions can be gleaned from the writings of French
missionaries like Le Loutre, mentioned earlier, and Abbé Pierre
Maillard (1710–62). In his polemic against British expansion-
ism, An Account of the Customs and Manners of the Mickmakis
and Maricheets, Savage Nations, Now Dependant on the Gov-
ernment at Cape Breton (1758), Maillard recounted an episode
that took place during a French retreat from Annapolis Royal
in 1744:
. . . towards the end of October, Mr. Gorrhon [Gorham] commanding
a detachment of English troops, sent to observe the retreat of the
French and savages were making from before Port Royal in Acadia:
This detachment having found two huts of the Mickmaki-savages, in
a remote corner, in which there were five women and three children
(two of the women being big with child), ransacked, pillaged and
burnt the two huts, and massacred the five women and three children.
It is to be observed, that the two pregnant women were found with
their bellies ripped open. An action which those savages cannot forget,
especially as at that time they made fair war with the English. They
have always looked on this deed as a singular mark of the most
unheard-of cruelty.52
Indeed, the incident was one sticking point in the protracted
dispute over unpaid scalp bounties. Although the facts are not
in contention—the rangers did kill noncombatants outside An-
napolis Royal in 1744—Maillard’s propagandist critique em-
bellishes them to convey the Mi’kmaqs’ ostensible ire. The
image of the unborn child ripped from its mother’s womb is
designed to provoke an extreme reaction and, since ancient
times, has served to discredit one’s enemy as dishonorable
and uncivilized. During the war, British settlers frequently ac-
cused French-allied Indians of the outrage; most charges were
52Pierre Maillard, An Account of the Customs and Manners of the Mickmakis
and Maricheets, Savage Nations, Now Dependant on the Government at Cape Breton
(London, 1758), pp. 62–63.
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subsequently proven to be false. In any case, whether Maillard’s
report of the incident is true or distorted for effect, Indians
in Nova Scotia cited it years later when calling for revenge.
Their hatred of English invaders openly celebrated in their rit-
uals, the Mi’kmaq were soon routinely torturing and executing
English prisoners. Violence begat violence. British officials in
Nova Scotia’s Governor’s Council, of which John Gorham was a
member, offered bounties for Mi’kmaq scalps along with “pre-
miums for dead Indians” as high as £10 sterling. No longer
simply a military strategy, imperial violence in the Maritimes
during the 1740s and 1750s began to take on the appearance
of ethnic cleansing, a war intended to remove or exterminate a
population rather than merely defeat an opposing army.53
The enmity the rangers inspired was described by William
Pote, captain of one of the provincial supply vessels captured in
1745 along with the Indian rangers at Annapolis Royal. During
the trek to Quebec, Pote kept a journal in which he recorded
that several Indian rangers were beaten, tortured, and killed
by Mi’kmaq hoping to assuage their grief for the loved ones
the rangers had murdered. Still, the types of torture and abuse
Pote describes were not at all uncommon on the frontier and
during this era. Less common was the hatred the Mi’kmaq felt
toward the company’s leader, John Gorham, whom Mi’kmaq
snipers tried to assassinate several times.54
53The use of this image has a long history (Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, pp. 81–
85, 169–70; Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal, p. 149). Shortly after the siege
of Louisbourg in 1745, another incident further fueled Mi’kmaq resentment: New
England soldiers desecrated a Catholic Mi’kmaq burial ground near Port Toulouse on
Cape Breton Island (The Old Man Told Us: Excerpts from Mi’Kmaw History, 1500–
1950, ed. Ruth Holmes Whitehead [Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1991], pp. 110–11,
115). Ethnic cleansing is defined by the United Nations as “a purposeful policy designed
by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means
the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic
areas” (United Nations Security Council, “Final Report of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 [1992],” http://www.un.org;
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” Foreign Affairs 72 [1993]:
110).
54The Journal of Captain William Pote, pp. 59–60, 62–63, 86. See Daniel K. Richter,
The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of
European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), pp. 32–
38, 144–49, 233–34. Wayne Lee (Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare,
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John Knox, an Irish officer in the British garrison at Fort
Cumberland, on the Chignecto Peninsula, witnessed a chilling
event in January 1759. When a company of rangers, Captain
Benoni Danks’s men, were sent out to “scour the country”
for several rangers and a number of regulars who had disap-
peared, they discovered that the four regulars had been partially
stripped, scalped while alive, and then shot. The Mi’kmaq at-
tack was probably orchestrated by Abbé Maillard, who, since
the capture of Le Loutre in 1755, was coordinating what was
left of the crumbling Acadian-Mi’kmaq resistance to the British.
Whether or not the one ranger’s body found was a New En-
gland Indian is not mentioned, although according to a 1758
muster list, Danks’s company contained at least five Natives. In
any case, he had not been shot; the skin on his head had been
“flayed” and his entire scalp removed, then he was bludgeoned
to death. Thereafter the unfortunate ranger’s corpse had been
carefully mutilated; a “great deliberation was used in this bar-
barous dirty work,” Knox commented. The soldiers at the fort
told Knox that they had seen such handicraft before; it was a
special ceremonial treatment reserved for rangers who fell into
Mi’kmaq hands.55
In a final sign to their enemies, the Mi’kmaq warriors cov-
ered the body with writing. As Knox described, “the ranger’s
body was all marked with a stick and blood in heiroglypic
[sic] characters.” The writing on the ranger’s corpse, indeci-
pherable to English observers but intelligible to Mi’kmaq ob-
servers, was komquejwi’kasikl—a combination of pictographs,
1500–1865 [New York: Oxford University Press, 2011]) speculates that Indians’ ability
to focus their vengeance on the actual perpetrators often led to more restrained
treatment of other prisoners (pp. 155–58, 163–64). The Mi’kmaq only managed to
wound Gorham seriously once, in April 1750, when, near Pizquid, a party of Indians
ambushed the rangers. A doctor’s detailed account of treating the terrible leg wound
he received was published in the press (Boston News-Letter, 15 September 1748 and
28 June 1750; New York Gazette, 16 April 1750).
55Knox, Historical Journal, 1:288–91. This is no doubt a reference to an incident,
reported in the Boston Weekly News on 18 August 1757, surrounding the capture of
a thirty-man detachment of rangers outside Fort Cumberland on 1 July 1757. The
report included descriptions of the grisly mutilations (French and Indian War Notices
Abstracted from Colonial Newspapers, vol. 2: 1756–1757, ed. Armand Francis Lucier
[Lanham, Md.: Heritage Books, 2007], p. 276); “A Roll of the Ranging Company at
Fort Cumberland.”
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mnemonic devices, and symbols—an independently created in-
digenous script, which anthropologists argue predates Euro-
pean contact. Catholic missionaries quickly saw the value of
komquejwi’kasikl, most often employed in reciting prayers, as a
tool for spreading Christianity, and they encouraged its use. The
Mi’kmaq having converted to Catholicism in the seventeenth
century, French warrior-priests like Le Loutre, Maillard, and
others fanned anti-Protestant sentiment among the Indians,
which in the 1740s the missionaries in turn used to promote
Mi’kmaq violence against the British, a deal they sweetened
with an offer to pay bounties for English scalps. The Mi’kmaq
did not need such elaborate incentives. Hunter-warriors long
before the French arrived, they were a proud people who pos-
sessed a keen sense of justice and retribution. Ill treatment
of Mi’kmaqs was met with swift reprisal, as were attacks on
Mi’kmaq independence.56
The ritualistic despoliation of the ranger’s body is open to a
number of interpretations. It may simply have been a sign of
Mi’kmaq contempt for their defeated enemy. However, the
hieroglyphs, usually reserved for sacred writings, may have
marked the rangers as spiritual Others—the true savages; devils
incarnate; enemies of France, of the Catholic Church, and of
God. Perhaps the komquejwi’kasikl signaled that the Mi’kmaq
were engaged in a Holy War. Three months later British troops
found the remains of the other missing regulars and rangers.
They too had been “cut and mangled in the most shocking
manner.”57
56David Schmidt and Murdena Marshall (Mi’Kmaq Hieroglyphic Prayers: Readings
in North America’s First Indigenous Script [Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1995]) found
that the hieroglyphs were not only used in sacred worship but also sometimes for send-
ing messages. Knox, Historical Journal, 1:89–90; Prins, The Mi’Kmaq, pp. 118–22, 131,
136–37. Many British colonial soldiers also saw the larger geopolitical contest between
England and France as fundamentally a religious struggle between Protestantism and
Catholicism (see Anderson, A People’s Army, pp. 196–223, and Ann M. Little, Abra-
ham in Arms: War and Gender in Colonial New England [Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2007], pp. 166–204).
57French and Indian War Notices, 3:233. Thanks to Harald E. L. Prins, of Kansas
State University, for advice on interpreting komquejwi’kasikl. Prins, The Mi’Kmaq, pp.
85–87, 133–52; Erik R. Seeman, Death in the New World: Cross-Cultural Encounters,
1492–1800 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), pp. 55–57, 92–94,
176–77, 273–74; Knox, Historical Journal, 1:288–91; Finn, “Le Loutre, Jean-Louis”;
and Micheline D. Johnson, “Maillard, Pierre,” Canadian Biography Online.
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The Mi’kmaq revenge killings testify dramatically to the fear
and loathing directed toward Gorham’s Rangers and its sister
unit under Captain Danks. Almost inevitably, such deep emo-
tions had a lasting impact on the reputation of the British ranger
corps in Nova Scotia. Some settlers characterized Danks’s com-
pany as “a merciless soldiery” and “bloody hounds” and their
actions as “barbarous proceedings.” The British regulars along-
side whom the rangers sometimes served were shocked by their
cruel ways. In April 1758, during a mission to remove recal-
citrant Acadians from settlements lining the Petitcodiac River
on the Bay of Fundy, tensions flared between regulars and
rangers over the treatment of an Acadian woman. Lieutenant
Knox recorded his eyewitness account of this event as well:
“One of the French women, seeing her children seized by a
ranger, knocked him down, which another resenting, grasped
his tomahock (or small hatchet) and would instantly have laid
her head open, had not he been prevented by a regular Offi-
cer.”58
The barbarity of American frontier warfare was especially ab-
horrent to British officers and soldiers during the siege of Que-
bec. Enraged when Indians and Canadians scalped Englishmen
they had captured, James Wolfe, the British commanding gen-
eral, issued angry manifestoes threatening devastating reprisals
if the practice continued. Despite his indignation, Wolfe failed
to prevent his own troops from committing similar “barbarities”
against Canadians and Indians. Wolfe wrote his first protest
just days after Gorham’s men scalped the nine Indians on Île
d’Orléans. Lieutenant Malcolm Fraser of the Seventy-eighth
Regiment noted in disgust that a party of rangers sent to take
prisoners and gather intelligence about French defenses killed
two young children they had captured. When recalling the in-
cident, Fraser launched into a tirade against American frontier
warfare. The children were, according to him,
in a most inhuman manner murdered by these worse than savage
Rangers, for fear, as they pretend, they should be discovered by the
58Papers Relating to the Forcible Removal, p. 141; Knox, Historical Journal, 1:155–
56.
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noise of the children. I wish this story were not fact, but I am afraid
there is little reason to doubt it—the wretches having boasted of it on
their return . . . this barbarous action proceeded from the cowardice
and barbarity which seems so natural to a native of America, whether
Indian or European extraction.
Fraser clearly had little stomach for killing noncombatants, al-
though the highland regiments in which he served notoriously
gave no quarter on the battlefield, and some regulars took
scalps during the campaign. The rangers, of course, especially
Gorham’s company, had a track record of killing and scalping
civilians as a way of terrorizing enemy populations in order to
force them to submit to British rule; moreover, this combined
company of Anglo-Americans and Indians scalped noncombat-
ants of all ethnic backgrounds. What was appalling for the
Europeans was simply business as usual along the American
frontier.59
“Ventured My Life in Defense
of the English People”
Serving in the military during the colonial wars offered
New England’s Indian men not only a means of proving
themselves in accord with their culture’s hunter-warrior def-
initions of masculinity but also short-term economic benefits—
wages, debt relief, and access to trade goods—for themselves
59“Memoirs of the Siege of Quebec and Total Reduction of Canada in 1759 and
1760 by John Johnson, Clerk and Quarter Mas’r Sergeant to the 58th Reg’t,” in A.
Doughty, The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, 6 vols. (Quebec:
Dussault and Proulx, 1901–2), 5:80. For the extended quote by Fraser, see Extract from
a Manuscript Journal, Relating to the Siege of Quebec in 1759, kept by Colonel Malcolm
Fraser, Then Lieutenant of the 78th (Fraser’s Highlanders) (Quebec, 1866), pp. 6–7.
See also Way, “The Cutting Edge of Culture,” pp. 131–35; Ian M. McCulloch and
Timothy J. Todish, British Light Infantryman of the Seven Years’ War: North America
1757–1763 (London: Osprey Publishing, 2004), pp. 4–11; George A. Bray, “Major
Scott’s Provisional Light Infantry Battalion,” Early America Review 1 (1996), online
at http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/winter96/; Colin G. Calloway, White People,
Indians, and Highlanders: Tribal People and Colonial Encounters in Scotland and
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Geoffrey Plank, “New England
Soldiers in the St. John River Valley, 1758–1760,” in New England and the Maritime
Provinces: Connections and Comparisons, ed. Stephan J. Hornsby and John G. Reid
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), pp. 68–69.
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and their families. But by the early 1760s, the costs of re-
peated deployments—death, disease, injury, and captivity—
outweighed any advantages of soldiering. In 1749, Gorham
noted that during the company’s first three years, three-
quarters of the Indians in the rangers were killed or captured,
an incredibly high casualty rate for this or any era.
The rangers’ commander reminded Massachusetts authori-
ties that such devastation “impoverishes that county [Barnsta-
ble] in this Province where said Company was raised,” imposing
on it “a burthen . . . of Widows and Children of the Deceased
and those in Captivity.” Gorham did not exaggerate. The fifty
to sixty Wampanoag and Nauset men initially recruited for
the company in 1744 comprised over half of the able-bodied
Indian men in Barnstable County.60 The small population clus-
ters at Mattakesett (“Indiantown” in Yarmouth), Potanomacut
(in Harwich), and Nauset (in Eastham) were devastated by the
wartime casualties. In a joint petition written toward the end
of the French and Indian War, village leaders explained that
“Many of our nation have entered into ye war with the En-
glish against ye French and Indian[s] in alliance with them[,]
and many of them have Died in ye service & left ye squas &
60My calculation is based on the populations of Barnstable County’s Indian reser-
vations and enclaves circa 1750. The six largest communities contained around 595
individuals (Mashpee 260; Herring Pond 115; Potanomacut 80; Yarmouth 60; Chatham
30; and Harwich 50), with another 110 individuals living in small clusters or individual
households in Falmouth, Barnstable, and elsewhere, for a total of 705 individuals. Be-
cause women historically outnumbered men in Native communities and due to other
demographics relating to age, we can assume that no more than 15 percent of the pop-
ulation (or 106 individuals) was fit for military service. Gorham enlisted approximately
fifty-five Wampanoag and Nauset men from Barnstable County for the initial company
in 1744, or half of all those available. My estimates are based on various population
counts by missionaries or Anglo-American observers. See Elisha Tupper, “Herring
Pond Indians, 1757,” MHS, Misc. Bound Manuscripts, August 1757; Extracts from
the Itineraries and other miscellanies of Ezra Stiles, D.D., LL.D, 1755–1794 . . . , ed.
Franklin Dexter Bowditch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), pp. 162, 165,
167–70; anon., “Report of a Committee on the State of the Indians in Mashpee and
Parts Adjacent [in 1767],” Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 2d ser. 3 (1815),
pp. 12–17; “The Number of Indians Belonging to the Potenomacut Chh[urch],” MHS,
Misc. Bound Manuscripts, December 1765; entry for 19 July 1758, Gideon Hawley,
Diary, MHS; and Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1st ser. 10 (1809):
112–15, 129–36. On Indian women outnumbering Indian men historically, see Patricia
Rubertone, Grave Undertaking: The Archaeology of Roger Williams and the Narra-
gansett Indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), pp. 161–64.
NATIVE AMERICAN RANGERS 427
children in distressing circumstances.” Others returned home
wounded and disabled, but there were no resources to ease
their plight. In some instances, overseers sold reservation lands
to pay for the support of these needy families and veterans,
which accelerated the problem of land loss and the fractional-
ization of reservation holdings.61
Few of southern New England’s Indian communities re-
mained untouched by the colonial wars. Native women had
long outnumbered men, but now the demographic imbalance
became acute, and they were forced to look outside their com-
munities for husbands. Marriage between whites and nonwhites
in the region was not only illegal but discouraged by custom,
and so Indian women increasingly turned to enslaved and free
African males. This pattern of exogamous marriage became the
norm in the next generation. These unions produced mixed-
race offspring that whites referred to as “mustee” or “mulatto”
(although the two terms were often used interchangeably, the
former designation was generally reserved for individuals of
mixed African and Native ancestry and the latter typically ap-
plied to people of mixed European and African ancestry). After
the Revolution, especially, when these mixed-race individuals
grew into adulthood, they were no longer deemed “real” In-
dians; instead, whites categorized them as “blacks” and associ-
ated them with their African ancestry, frequently denying their
61Participation in the wars ravaged Natick, just outside of Boston. Jean O’Brien
identified almost thirty Natick Indians who served in the military in King George’s
War and the Seven Years War (some in Gorham’s Rangers). Many died from disease
contracted in the military. In 1758, Indian soldiers returning to Mashpee infected
their community as well. O’Brien, Dispossession by Degrees, pp. 142–48, 150, 156–62,
212–15; Mandell, Behind the Frontier, pp. 118, 128–29; Stephen Badger, “Historical
and Characteristic Traits of the American Indians in General, and those of Natick
in Particular,” Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society for the Year 1798
(1798), pp. 40–41. The gender imbalance created by losses in the colonial wars is
a phenomenon long noted. See Jack Campisi, The Mashpee Indians: Tribe on Trial
(Ithaca: Syracuse University Press, 1991), pp. 87–89; Hutchins, Mashpee, pp. 79–88;
Den Ouden, Beyond Conquest, pp. 30–38; and esp. Mandell, Tribe, Race, History,
pp. 39–40, 42–59. For the impact on Cape Indian communities, see Petition of Isaac
James et al., 19 November 1757, Mass. Archives, 33:10. The severe losses Gorham
noted in his petition compare to some of the worst casualty rates reported during the
Seven Years War (Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate
of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766 [New York: Vintage Books, 2000], pp.
105, 240, 244–47, 337, 501).
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Native heritage altogether. As such, whites felt that these in-
dividuals were not entitled to status as tribal members and so
perceived tribal rolls as shrinking. Further, the growing number
of mixed-race individuals exacerbated (or sometimes created)
internal divisions within tribes. As the number of “pure-bloods”
dwindled and with mixed-race Indians often denied status as
tribal members, whites questioned tribal sovereignty, which led
to lands becoming more vulnerable to seizure, and resulted in
some reservations being broken up and sold off in a final act
of dispossession. Declining numbers of Indian men, frequent
intermarriage between blacks and Indians, and the increasingly
mixed-race character of New England tribes after the colo-
nial wars were taken by whites to be evidence of what they
wanted to see: Indian degeneracy and disappearance. Reports
of Indian men’s courageous service in the colonial wars of the
northeast were quickly forgotten, replaced by a narrative of
Anglo-American conquest and the marginalization of ostensibly
inferior indigenous peoples, who had no place in the emerging
nation.62
More than twenty-five years ago, Fred Anderson argued in
A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the
Seven Years’ War that service in the imperial wars shaped
the identity of white New Englanders not only as citizens
of the empire but, more important, as Americans, who were
different from the English alongside whom they fought. Peter
Silver has asserted, on the contrary, that the terror of colonial
frontier warfare, in which Indians played such a significant
role, tended to collapse distinctions among Europeans and
solidified a “white” racial identity as well as strengthened a
62Mandell, Tribe, Race, History, pp. 22, 24, 35–59, 67, 167–83, 197–201, and “Shift-
ing Boundaries of Race and Ethnicity: Indian-Black Intermarriage in Southern New
England, 1760–1880,” Journal of American History 85 (1998): 466–501; Ruth Wallis
Herndon and Ella Wilcox Sekatau, “The Right to a Name: Narragansett People and
Rhode Island Officials in the Revolutionary Era,” in American Encounters: Natives
and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500–1850, ed. Peter C.
Mancall and James Hart Merrell (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 437–39; Jack D.
Forbes, Africans and Native Americans: The Language of Race and the Evolution of
Red-Black Peoples (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pp. 215–17; O’Brien,
Dispossession by Degrees, pp. 146, 201–3, 214.
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commitment to representative government. In light of these
arguments, one might ask how forays into the contested
northeastern borderlands shaped Indian soldiers’ identity
vis-à-vis provincial whites as well as the British troops with
whom they served. The reflections of one veteran of Gorham’s
Rangers might be a good place to begin such an investigation.
John Simons, a Wampanoag preacher from the Teticut
reservation in Middleboro, Massachusetts, served in the
provincial forces as well as in Gorham’s Rangers, where he
was the unofficial chaplain for the unit’s Native Americans.
In 1752, he lost his leg in battle, returned home unable to
work, and was reduced to penury. As his lands were being
seized by creditors, he wrote a bitterly worded petition to
the Massachusetts legislature in which he begged for aid,
reminding lawmakers that “[I have] five times ventured my life
in defense of the English people.”63 He knew British colonists
benefited from his services, yet he clearly did not feel like
one of them. Originally motivated to fight for the English
as a cultural and economic survival strategy, Simons and his
fellow Indian veterans found that their service in the military
reinforced their status as a distinct, socially marginal, and
expendable minority. Gorham’s Indian rangers played a crucial
part in conquering territory for the empire and transforming
how wars were fought in the northeast even as they were
being dispossessed of lands that were rightfully theirs.
63Mass. Archives, 32:318, 419–21.
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